stelow-workflow-plan-critique

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-controlled product specification files (spec-product*.md) through multiple parallel subagents. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a product plan could influence the agent's analysis, bias the critique outcomes, or manipulate the resolution process.
  • Ingestion points: The contents of spec-product*.md are read and processed in the critique:30 and critique:50 steps.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used when providing the plan content to the LLM subagents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (updating the plan), invoke subagents, and interact with the user via the ask_user_question tool.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not mention any sanitization, validation, or escaping of the input specification content before it is processed by the subagents.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to resolve project state, parse configurations, and manage files.
  • Evidence: The skill uses node -e within shell commands in SKILL.md to parse JSON data from the stelow.json configuration file.
  • Evidence: It sources a utility script (read-config.sh) from a relative path belonging to a related skill (stelow-workflow-orchestrator), assuming a specific directory structure.
  • Evidence: Standard utilities like grep, ls, and mkdir are used to extract metadata from plan files and organize the critique output directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 09:06 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stelow-workflow-plan-critique