stelow-workflow-plan-critique
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-controlled product specification files (
spec-product*.md) through multiple parallel subagents. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in a product plan could influence the agent's analysis, bias the critique outcomes, or manipulate the resolution process. - Ingestion points: The contents of
spec-product*.mdare read and processed in thecritique:30andcritique:50steps. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings used when providing the plan content to the LLM subagents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (updating the plan), invoke subagents, and interact with the user via the
ask_user_questiontool. - Sanitization: The skill does not mention any sanitization, validation, or escaping of the input specification content before it is processed by the subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to resolve project state, parse configurations, and manage files.
- Evidence: The skill uses
node -ewithin shell commands inSKILL.mdto parse JSON data from thestelow.jsonconfiguration file. - Evidence: It sources a utility script (
read-config.sh) from a relative path belonging to a related skill (stelow-workflow-orchestrator), assuming a specific directory structure. - Evidence: Standard utilities like
grep,ls, andmkdirare used to extract metadata from plan files and organize the critique output directory.
Audit Metadata