stelow-workflow-shape-up
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation in
references/cli-tools/cymbal.mdprovides installation instructions using a piped remote script pattern (irm ... | iex) from an untrusted GitHub repository (1broseidon/cymbal). This pattern is highly dangerous as it executes unverified code directly from the internet. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
sourcecommand to load shell scripts from dynamically computed relative paths (e.g.,../../stelow-workflow-orchestrator/references/cli-tools/read-config.sh). This creates a dependency on external skill files and could be exploited if the directory structure or linked files are compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from multiple external sources without sanitization or boundary markers, including
stelow.json,context/blocking-constraints.md,context/tech-preview.md, andcontext/existing-features.md. This data is then used to inform product planning and shaping decisions. - Ingestion points:
stelow.json,context/blocking-constraints.md,context/tech-preview.md,context/existing-features.md, and user-provided problem statements. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions for processing these files.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands, interaction with the
subagentstool, and usage of theasktool for user interaction. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation of the ingested content is performed before it influences the agent's logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands and Node.js snippets (e.g.,
node -e "...") to process project configuration and codebase information.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata