Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents using libraries like
pypdfandpdfplumber, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where hidden instructions in the document could influence the agent. - Ingestion points: PDF files are opened in
SKILL.md(e.g.,PdfReader('document.pdf')),FORMS.md, and scripts likeextract_form_field_info.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions found within the processed PDF data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files (
writer.write,image.save), generate reports, and execute CLI tools (qpdf,pdftk). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted content before further use.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms runtime monkeypatching of a library method (pypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inherited) to resolve a specific formatting bug in selection list fields. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation encourages usage of CLI tools like
pdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andpdfimagesfor document manipulation tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on standard third-party libraries including
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pandas,pypdfium2, and Node.js packagespdf-libandpdfjs-dist.
Audit Metadata