build-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the
argsparameter and passes it verbatim to multiple sub-agents and internal tools like/brainstormingand/policy-algebra. This represents a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious input could influence the generation or synthesis of the final skill instructions. - Ingestion points: User-supplied
argsstring processed in Step 1 and Step 5. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to separate untrusted data from instruction templates when passing to sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: File system writes to
~/.claude/skills/, execution ofpnpm validate, and use of the/shiptool. - Sanitization: The skill instructions explicitly state to pass the specification "verbatim," without mentioned sanitization or validation of the input content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local shell commands to manage the environment and validate output, including
git rev-parse,mktemp, andpnpm validate. While these are part of a standard development workflow, they run in the local user context based on the generated content.
Audit Metadata