publish-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands including
git,cp,jq, andnpxto manage file lifecycle and repository state. These commands operate on local paths like.agents/skills/and a target repository path, granting the agent significant control over the filesystem and source code history. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instruction executes
npx skills add, which triggers a download and execution of theskillspackage from the npm registry. The use of a generic package name without a version or scope increases the risk of a supply chain attack or the execution of an unintended package. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to perform
git pushoperations to a remote repository (specified by$AI_SKILLS_PATH). While this is the intended functionality for publishing skills, it constitutes a transfer of local content to an external remote system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from
SKILL.mdfiles located in.agents/skills/. This exposes the agent to indirect prompt injection if a skill being processed contains malicious instructions designed to influence the agent or thecode-reviewertool. - Ingestion points: Processes
SKILL.mdfiles in Step 2 and Step 4. - Boundary markers: None specified for the content of the skills being reviewed.
- Capability inventory: Includes file system access (
cp), repository management (git), and remote execution (npx). - Sanitization: The skill includes a mitigation step by invoking a
code-revieweragent to inspect the changes before they are committed and pushed.
Audit Metadata