pr-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands via
gh(GitHub CLI) andgitto view PR details, fetch diffs, manage worktrees, and post reviews. The construction of these commands (e.g.,gh pr view <PR>) involves direct interpolation of user-provided arguments, which could lead to command injection if the agent does not properly sanitize the input. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (GitHub PR bodies, comments, and code) to perform automated audits and post reviews. A malicious PR author could embed instructions in the PR description or code comments designed to trick the audit lenses.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches PR metadata, descriptions, and comments using
gh pr viewinSKILL.md, and reads the entire changed codebase within a worktree for analysis. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate the untrusted PR content from the agent's audit instructions when delegating tasks to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to post automated reviews, request changes, and execute a local monitoring script (
watch-response.py). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the PR content before it is processed by the analysis lenses.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled Python script (
watch-response.py) usingpython3to monitor PR activity. This script interacts with the local filesystem (storing state in~/.local/state/pr-brief-watch/) and the GitHub CLI. While the script itself appears functional and benign, it represents a dynamic execution surface within the skill's directory.
Audit Metadata