design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from research findings and external guides to generate work orders.
- Ingestion points:
research/*.json,<task_folder>/design-guides-read.json. - Boundary markers: No explicit prompt delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when interpolating external content into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: Scoped shell execution via
design-actions.sh, Agent dispatch to various roles (design-critic,internal-searcher), and file writing to the task folder. - Sanitization: The
design-actions.shscript usesjqfor robust JSON construction and implements arefuse_if_unsafecheck (sourced fromrecipes.sh) that flags shell characters in generated commands. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill can generate and store shell commands in work orders (
--runentries) based on external recipes or research findings. - Evidence: The
verifycommand indesign-actions.shallows adding commands to work orders using the--runflag. - Mitigation: The skill requires explicit human approval (
--approve-runs) at theclosestage before any machine-generated command can be executed in subsequent build stages. The script also performs validation of the command string to prevent common shell injection patterns.
Audit Metadata