visual-content
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically modifies the Python search path (
sys.path) at runtime to import helper modules such asicons. It determines the source directory using theBRAND_CONTENT_DESIGN_DIRenvironment variable or hardcoded fallback paths within the user's home directory (e.g.,~/.claude/plugins/marketplaces/camoa-skills/). This pattern of dynamic loading from computed paths represents a risk factor. The skill also provides Python code snippets for the agent to execute, performing environment-level tasks such as loading custom fonts fromassets/fonts/, reading image files, and writing generated presentation files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from several external sources:
- Ingestion points:
canvas-philosophy.md,brand-philosophy.md, and user-provided content outlines. - Boundary markers: Explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are absent.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
reportlabfor PDF generation, writes to the filesystem (PDF/PPTX), and performs SVG conversion viacairosvg. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or filtering to prevent malicious instructions embedded in the design documents from influencing the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata