byterover
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
curate.mddirect the agent to deploy sub-agent configurations (.claude/agents/brv-curate.mdand.codex/agents/brv-curate.toml) that explicitly usepermissionMode: bypassPermissions(for Claude Code) andsandbox_mode = "workspace-write"(for Codex). This is a direct attempt to circumvent the platform's security model and suppress human-in-the-loop permission prompts for shell command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection through its retrieval-augmented synthesis workflow.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from Markdown and HTML files located in the
.brv/context-tree/directory when performingbrv queryorbrv readoperations. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks specified boundary markers or instructions to treat retrieved content as data only, increasing the risk that embedded instructions could influence agent behavior during synthesis.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including arbitrary shell command execution via the
brvCLI, file system writes viabrv curate, and network operations viabrv vc pushandbrv vc pull. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the retrieved content before it is processed by the agent's language model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing the
brvcommand-line utility for knowledge storage, retrieval, version control, and diagnostic operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile instructs users to install thebyterover-clipackage from the official npm registry, which is a well-known service. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
vc.mdfile includes instructions for cloning project context trees from the vendor's domain athttps://byterover.dev/.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata