camunda-ai-agents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential surface for indirect prompt injection by demonstrating how to interpolate user-provided data directly into the agent's prompts.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via the
data.userPrompt.promptfield inSKILL.mdusing variables such ascustomerIdandissue. - Boundary markers: The prompt examples (e.g.,
="Customer " + customerId + " reports: " + issue) do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the variables as non-executable data. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute tools including REST connectors (
io.camunda:http-json:1) and script tasks, which could be leveraged if an injection succeeds (seereferences/tool-modeling.md). - Sanitization: There are no recommendations or examples for sanitizing input variables before prompt construction.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides examples of using the
c8ctlCLI for legitimate development tasks, such as applying element templates and linting BPMN files (e.g.,c8ctl element-template applyandc8ctl bpmn lint). These are standard operations for Camunda 8 developers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions the
c8ctl element-template synccommand, which fetches official connector templates from Camunda's registry. This is an expected configuration step within the vendor's ecosystem.
Audit Metadata