camunda-ai-agents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential surface for indirect prompt injection by demonstrating how to interpolate user-provided data directly into the agent's prompts.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested via the data.userPrompt.prompt field in SKILL.md using variables such as customerId and issue.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt examples (e.g., ="Customer " + customerId + " reports: " + issue) do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the variables as non-executable data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute tools including REST connectors (io.camunda:http-json:1) and script tasks, which could be leveraged if an injection succeeds (see references/tool-modeling.md).
  • Sanitization: There are no recommendations or examples for sanitizing input variables before prompt construction.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides examples of using the c8ctl CLI for legitimate development tasks, such as applying element templates and linting BPMN files (e.g., c8ctl element-template apply and c8ctl bpmn lint). These are standard operations for Camunda 8 developers.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill mentions the c8ctl element-template sync command, which fetches official connector templates from Camunda's registry. This is an expected configuration step within the vendor's ecosystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 06:12 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — camunda-ai-agents