system-prompts

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recommends a specific tone pattern in SKILL.md that explicitly tells the AI agent that user instructions should supersede its initial directives.
  • Evidence: "Instructions further down the conversation, including user's own, ALWAYS override prior style, tone, formatting, and initiative preferences."
  • This pattern is dangerous as it intentionally lowers the agent's resistance to malicious user prompts that seek to bypass original constraints.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides architectures for agents to process untrusted data, specifically in the case studies for small models.
  • Ingestion points: small-models.md contains a case study for generating session titles based on data provided in a <user> tag.
  • Boundary markers: The skill recommends using explicit XML-style tags (e.g., <user>, <title>) to separate instructions from data, though these can still be bypassed in adversarial scenarios.
  • Capability inventory: This skill is documentation-based and does not define active tools, subprocesses, or network operations.
  • Sanitization: The skill correctly recommends post-processing (e.g., normalizeGeneratedTitle) in external code to strip suspicious content from model outputs, which is a valid mitigation strategy.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 12:11 PM