system-prompts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill recommends a specific tone pattern in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly tells the AI agent that user instructions should supersede its initial directives. - Evidence: "Instructions further down the conversation, including user's own, ALWAYS override prior style, tone, formatting, and initiative preferences."
- This pattern is dangerous as it intentionally lowers the agent's resistance to malicious user prompts that seek to bypass original constraints.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides architectures for agents to process untrusted data, specifically in the case studies for small models.
- Ingestion points:
small-models.mdcontains a case study for generating session titles based on data provided in a<user>tag. - Boundary markers: The skill recommends using explicit XML-style tags (e.g.,
<user>,<title>) to separate instructions from data, though these can still be bypassed in adversarial scenarios. - Capability inventory: This skill is documentation-based and does not define active tools, subprocesses, or network operations.
- Sanitization: The skill correctly recommends post-processing (e.g.,
normalizeGeneratedTitle) in external code to strip suspicious content from model outputs, which is a valid mitigation strategy.
Audit Metadata