commit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data through
git diffandgit log. Instructions embedded within code comments or commit messages in the repository could potentially influence the agent's behavior during the commit process. - Ingestion points: The skill reads
git diff(file content changes) andgit log(previous commit history). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard instructions found within the diff or logs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute
git add,git commit, andgit push. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the content retrieved from git commands before it is processed by the agent.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a direct contradiction between the skill's
descriptionand itsProcesssection. The description states the skill is for creating commits "without pushing," whereas Step 8 of the process explicitly instructs the agent to "Rungit pushunless otherwise specified." This discrepancy could lead the agent to perform an action (uploading code) that contradicts the user's expectations based on the skill's title and description. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for its primary functions. It uses
gitto stage files, create commits, and push changes to remote repositories. While these are intended functions, they represent the capability to modify the project state and interact with remote servers.
Audit Metadata