retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the
observations.mdfile, which is populated by another command (/observe). This file could contain instructions that attempt to influence the agent's behavior when they are 'drained' during the retro process. - Ingestion points: The agent reads the file
$VAULT_ROOT/Profile/observations.mdand processes its content. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are specified for the contents of the observations file.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to edit files, change settings, rewrite other skills, and commit changes across multiple repositories (
~/Repos/skills,~/dotfiles). - Sanitization: The skill includes a human-in-the-loop requirement ('Hassan accepts, redirects, or rejects. Nothing is applied on the agent's own authority'), which acts as a primary control against malicious output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to resolve environment variables and interact with the file system and version control across several sensitive directories.
- Evidence: The skill operates on
~/dotfiles,~/Repos/skills, and the vault root, involving file edits and git commits.
Audit Metadata