copycat-scout
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run local Python scripts (e.g.,
scout_competitors.py) to manage the discovery and ranking process. These scripts interact with the local file system to store and organize results. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated HTTP requests to
itunes.apple.com,apps.apple.com, andplay.google.comto fetch app metadata and rankings. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted text (app names, developer names, genres) from public app stores.
- Ingestion points: Application metadata fetched via
AppleClientandGooglePlayClientindiscovery.py. - Boundary markers: None. The skill renders untrusted data directly into Markdown tables in
shortlist.mdwithout delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill generates lists of URLs (
review-urls.txt) intended for subsequent processing by other tools and writes JSON/Markdown reports to the workspace. - Sanitization: Content is only sanitized for Markdown table syntax (escaping pipes); there is no filtering for natural language instructions.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: In
apple_store.py, theAppleClientclass implements an--insecureflag that invokesssl._create_unverified_context(). This disables TLS certificate validation, exposing the agent's network traffic to potential man-in-the-middle attacks.
Audit Metadata