hyperframes-slide

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute npx hyperframes lint topics/<주제>. There is a risk of command injection if the <주제> (topic) placeholder, which typically comes from user input or project structure, is not sanitized before execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a font stylesheet from cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/fonts-archive/Paperlogy/subsets/Paperlogy-dynamic-subset.css. This is a standard use of a well-known CDN for assets and is considered safe.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data to generate slide content and update system files, creating an attack surface for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: User requests for slide creation ("슬라이드 만들어줘"), deck updates, and overview synchronization.
  • Boundary markers: None are specified in the instructions to separate untrusted user input from the generated HTML/CSS code.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write to the file system (modifying index.html and overview.html) and execute shell commands via npx.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are mentioned for content interpolated into the slide compositions or for arguments passed to the linting tool.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires registering GSAP timelines to window.__timelines, which involves runtime script execution within the browser environment. This is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of creating animated slide decks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 21, 2026, 06:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — hyperframes-slide