hyperframes-slide
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute
npx hyperframes lint topics/<주제>. There is a risk of command injection if the<주제>(topic) placeholder, which typically comes from user input or project structure, is not sanitized before execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a font stylesheet from
cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/fonts-archive/Paperlogy/subsets/Paperlogy-dynamic-subset.css. This is a standard use of a well-known CDN for assets and is considered safe. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data to generate slide content and update system files, creating an attack surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: User requests for slide creation ("슬라이드 만들어줘"), deck updates, and overview synchronization.
- Boundary markers: None are specified in the instructions to separate untrusted user input from the generated HTML/CSS code.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write to the file system (modifying
index.htmlandoverview.html) and execute shell commands vianpx. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are mentioned for content interpolated into the slide compositions or for arguments passed to the linting tool.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires registering GSAP timelines to
window.__timelines, which involves runtime script execution within the browser environment. This is consistent with the skill's stated purpose of creating animated slide decks.
Audit Metadata