framework-to-capacitor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!command`` syntax inSKILL.mdto execute shell commands automatically when the skill is accessed. - Evidence: The skill executes
node -eto parsepackage.jsonandfindto discover configuration files within the project directory. - This mechanism is used to provide the agent with a 'Live Project Snapshot' without manual user input.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The automated environment scanning process creates a vector where malicious content in local project files could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The shell command in
SKILL.mdreads thedependencies,devDependencies, andscriptssections ofpackage.jsonand prints them directly into the agent context. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the command output as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill specifies
allowed-toolsincludingBashwithnode -eandfind, allowing the agent to perform further file system operations based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: The ingested content from
package.jsonis not sanitized or validated before being injected into the prompt context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute various package manager and Capacitor CLI commands which modify the local system.
- Evidence: Instructions include
npm install,npx cap init,npx cap sync, andnpx cap runacrossSKILL.mdand the framework-specific reference files.
Audit Metadata