capgo-cloud-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by ingesting and processing various project files which could potentially contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the migration process.
- Ingestion points: The skill scans
package.json,capacitor.config.ts, source code files (TypeScript/JavaScript), and multiple CI/CD configuration files (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise, etc.). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the content of these files as untrusted or to ignore any embedded natural language instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to perform impactful actions based on the parsed data, including installing/uninstalling packages, rewriting imports and method calls in source files, and executing CLI commands.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined for the content extracted from the project files before it is used to generate code or execute commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses CLI tools to interact with the project and cloud services.
- Evidence: Commands include
npx @capawesome/clifor authentication, application management, channel creation, and signing key generation. It also usesnpx cap syncto synchronize the Capacitor project andnpm install/uninstallfor package management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves and installs external code and configuration.
- Evidence: The skill installs the
@capawesome/capacitor-live-updateand@capawesome/clipackages. It also provides a command to add an external MCP server fromhttps://mcp.capawesome.io/mcpto provide documentation and management tools.
Audit Metadata