capgo-cloud-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill directs the agent to scan for sensitive information within the project, including searching for
CAPGO_API_KEYin CI/CD pipeline configurations and private key files such as.capgo_key_v2in the project root. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@capawesome/capacitor-live-updatepackage from npm and utilizes the@capawesome/clitool. These resources originate from the skill's author,capawesome-team. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to run multiple shell commands using
npmandnpxfor package management, cloud authentication, and application configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies and processes information from various project files, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Project files including
package.json,capacitor.config.ts, and CI/CD workflow files (.github/workflows/*.yml,.gitlab-ci.yml,bitrise.yml,Jenkinsfile,azure-pipelines.yml). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not employ specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when processing the content of these external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to install software, modify project files, and perform network requests through vendor-provided CLI tools.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation mechanisms for the data ingested from project configuration files.
Audit Metadata