docx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands to invoke local helper scripts and system utilities for document processing.
- Evidence includes execution of
scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/office/unpack.py,scripts/office/pack.py,scripts/office/validate.py,scripts/accept_changes.py, andscripts/comment.py. - It also utilizes system binaries such as
pandocandpdftoppmfor text extraction and image conversion. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted
.docxfiles which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Document content is ingested into the agent context via
pandocextraction or XML unpacking of.docxfiles (referenced in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or security warnings to isolate extracted content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file writing (via
pack.pyand JavaScriptfs.writeFileSync) and command execution (via listed local scripts). - Sanitization: No evidence of content sanitization or filtering of extracted document text is provided in the skill instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external software to function.
- It instructs the user to install the
docxpackage globally vianpm install -g docx. - It references system-level dependencies including
pandoc,LibreOffice, andPoppler. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes JavaScript code at runtime to create document buffers.
- The agent is instructed to write JavaScript logic using the
docxlibrary and execute it to produce file output viaPacker.toBufferandfs.writeFileSync.
Audit Metadata