image-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions create an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted user data directly into shell command arguments.
- Ingestion points: User-defined strings for [theme], [description], and [region] found in the seven priority workflows in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill provides no instructions to wrap, escape, or delimit the user input within the shell command.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute the~/.claude/scripts/call-image-apiscript. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, shell-escaping, or filtering mechanisms to prevent malicious shell metacharacters from being executed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute a local utility script (
~/.claude/scripts/call-image-api) via theBashtool to interface with OpenAI and Google image engines. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic assembly of shell commands at runtime by concatenating the static script path and flags with variable user-provided prompt content.
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