change-status-ticket
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user inputs—specifically
actor,reason,authority_ref, andreopen_gate_id—and interpolates them into a shell command line. While the instructions mandate 'normalized' inputs and the rejection of 'secret-shaped' values, the use of double-quoted variables in a shell context without explicit escaping requirements creates a surface where malicious user input (e.g., containing shell substitutions like$(...)) could potentially influence the execution environment. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdunder theIntakesection. - Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to require 'normalized inputs' but lacks explicit delimiters or escaping instructions for the shell command interpolation.
- Capability inventory: Execution of a local Python script via a shell command in the
Execute one repository transactionsection ofSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill mentions rejecting 'secret-shaped inputs' and 'aliases/symlinks' during resolution, but does not provide specific instructions for sanitizing user-provided strings against shell metacharacters before command execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to execute a Python script (
ticket-autopilot.py) with multiple arguments. This is the primary mechanism for the skill's intended functionality but involves significant interaction with the host system's shell and file system.
Audit Metadata