change-status-ticket

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user inputs—specifically actor, reason, authority_ref, and reopen_gate_id—and interpolates them into a shell command line. While the instructions mandate 'normalized' inputs and the rejection of 'secret-shaped' values, the use of double-quoted variables in a shell context without explicit escaping requirements creates a surface where malicious user input (e.g., containing shell substitutions like $(...)) could potentially influence the execution environment.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md under the Intake section.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to require 'normalized inputs' but lacks explicit delimiters or escaping instructions for the shell command interpolation.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of a local Python script via a shell command in the Execute one repository transaction section of SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: The skill mentions rejecting 'secret-shaped inputs' and 'aliases/symlinks' during resolution, but does not provide specific instructions for sanitizing user-provided strings against shell metacharacters before command execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to execute a Python script (ticket-autopilot.py) with multiple arguments. This is the primary mechanism for the skill's intended functionality but involves significant interaction with the host system's shell and file system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 07:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — change-status-ticket