execute-ticket
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (Ticket Envelopes, ticket bodies, and repository documentation) which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Maliciously crafted tickets could attempt to influence the agent's code implementation or testing logic.
- Ingestion points: Ticket Envelope, ticket body, and repository documentation (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit directives to ignore embedded instructions within the external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent implements code changes, reproduces errors through tests, and executes QA plans.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ticket content is defined.
Audit Metadata