super-autopilote-issue
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to use
npx ctx7@latestto fetch documentation. This involves downloading and executing a package from the NPM registry at runtime. The use of the@latesttag makes the execution non-deterministic and susceptible to package takeover or malicious updates from an unverified source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to "execute/simulate each step" of a QA checklist generated from uncommitted code changes and issue descriptions. This involves the autonomous execution of shell commands derived from AI-generated plans based on local file content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "AFK contract" explicitly prevents the agent from calling
AskUserQuestionand requires it to make decisions autonomously. This removes the primary security control of human-in-the-loop review before executing generated commands or pushing code to remote repositories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes data from local
*.mdfiles to drive its implementation logic and QA simulation. - Ingestion points: Markdown issue files located in the target folder (e.g.,
docs/issues/). - Boundary markers: None; the agent directly parses and follows instructions within the
## Blocked byand acceptance criteria sections. - Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (tests/verification), file writing,
gitoperations, andghCLI for PR creation. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the contents of the issue files before they are used to generate the QA plan or implementation steps.
Audit Metadata