super-autopilote-issue

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to use npx ctx7@latest to fetch documentation. This involves downloading and executing a package from the NPM registry at runtime. The use of the @latest tag makes the execution non-deterministic and susceptible to package takeover or malicious updates from an unverified source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to "execute/simulate each step" of a QA checklist generated from uncommitted code changes and issue descriptions. This involves the autonomous execution of shell commands derived from AI-generated plans based on local file content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "AFK contract" explicitly prevents the agent from calling AskUserQuestion and requires it to make decisions autonomously. This removes the primary security control of human-in-the-loop review before executing generated commands or pushing code to remote repositories.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes data from local *.md files to drive its implementation logic and QA simulation.
  • Ingestion points: Markdown issue files located in the target folder (e.g., docs/issues/).
  • Boundary markers: None; the agent directly parses and follows instructions within the ## Blocked by and acceptance criteria sections.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (tests/verification), file writing, git operations, and gh CLI for PR creation.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the contents of the issue files before they are used to generate the QA plan or implementation steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 04:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — super-autopilote-issue