ticket-driver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from AI agents, such as task specifications, code reviews, and test plans. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points include
TASK.md(viaexecuteindriver.py),review.md(viaparse_findingsinc1b.py/chain_controller.py), andqa-plan.md(viaplanned_commandsinc1b.py). - The risk is mitigated by explicit instructions in prompts (e.g.,
prompts/judge.md) to ignore instructions within evidence and the use of regex-based parsing to isolate findings. - Capabilities include Git worktree management, local file writes, and execution of automated tests (limited to
python,node,npm). - Input validation includes strict regex matching for finding severities and
shlex.splitfor command parsing to prevent shell injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes automated tests and Git commands to manage worktrees and verify implementation quality.
- The skill uses
subprocessto rungit,python,node, andnpmas seen inscripts/driver.pyandscripts/findings.py. - Command execution is restricted to a whitelist of tools and lacks shell interpolation, mitigating the risk of arbitrary command injection.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends code diffs, tickets, and test observations to an external judgment service.
- Network requests are made to
api.typesafe.aiinscripts/arbiter.pyas part of the intended arbitration and quality assurance workflow. - The skill implements credential isolation for the
TYPESAFE_API_KEYusing theisolated_keycontext manager to prevent accidental exposure to model contexts or child processes.
Audit Metadata