pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a processing pipeline that ingests untrusted data from pull request diffs, branch names, and code symbols, which are subsequently interpolated into shell commands.
- Ingestion points: Pull request URLs, branch names, diff content, and pasted code processed in
SKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers to separate data from instructions within the diffs, nor do they instruct the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the reviewed code.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
git(log, show, blame, diff),gh(pr list/view), andcurlfor historical forensics and behavior observation. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping shell metacharacters in strings harvested from the PR before they are passed to shell commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform dynamic shell command execution based on untrusted external inputs.
- Evidence:
references/history-forensics.mdsuggests commands such asgit log -S '<symbol_or_constant>'where the symbol is extracted from the PR content. - Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 3, Pass I) explicitly directs the agent to runcurlcommands against the environment to observe behavior changes described in the PR.
Audit Metadata