carto-arcgis-migration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the agent generating and executing sophisticated Python scripts to handle data extraction, transformation, and asset management. Detailed code templates are provided in
references/migrate-data/extraction-recipes.md,references/migrate-maps/arcade-translation.md, andreferences/migrate-maps/marker-upload.md, which utilize libraries likegeopandas,pandas,PIL, andarcgisfor runtime processing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted metadata and content from external ArcGIS Portals, such as item titles, descriptions, and Arcade expressions, as described in
references/discover.mdandreferences/migrate-maps/app-absorption.md. This data is subsequently used to construct SQL queries and CARTO Builder configurations, creating a surface where malicious instructions within ArcGIS content could potentially manipulate the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: Fetches data via the ArcGIS REST API (
/sharing/rest/content/items/.../data) during the discovery and map migration phases. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used to instruct the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands within the ingested ArcGIS metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute SQL queries in the user's data warehouse, create and modify maps via the CARTO platform, and manage files on the local disk.
- Sanitization: Although the skill uses
sqlglotto validate translated SQL and applies slugification to identifiers, these measures do not protect the LLM from instruction-following attacks based on the ingested content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes shell commands, including the
cartoCLI,curl, andjq, to facilitate API communication and manage the migration manifest, as documented throughout the reference materials.
Audit Metadata