autonomous-improvement
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes an unattended operation watchdog mechanism designed to maintain agent sessions over long periods.
- Evidence:
assets/install-watchdog.shandassets/watchdog.shinstall and manage systemd user units (orchestrator-watchdog.serviceandorchestrator-watchdog.timer) to periodically nudge the agent session usingopencode run. - The installer also suggests using
sudo loginctl enable-lingerto ensure the persistence mechanism continues to run while the user is logged out. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework relies on executing arbitrary system commands defined in a
config.jsonfile for operations like setup, formatting, analysis, and running tests. - Evidence:
scripts/autonomous/common.py(via therunandgitfunctions),scripts/autonomous/mutation_engine.py(executingtest_cmd), andscripts/autonomous/orchestrator.pyall usesubprocess.runorsubprocess.Popento execute command-line arguments sourced from the project configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze arbitrary source code and test files from target repositories.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/autonomous/mutation_engine.pyreads source files for mutation, and the adversarial audit logic (Stream B) involves the agent reading test files to identify weaknesses. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the code comments or strings of audited files.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write to files (mutations), execute arbitrary shell commands (test runners), and interact with git remotes or GitHub PRs via the
ghtool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the repository content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata