case-progress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external system commands using the
subprocessmodule to perform document processing. - Evidence: The
_pdf_textfunction inscripts/case_store.pycallssubprocess.run(["pdftotext", str(path), "-"], ...)to extract text from PDF files found within the case directories. - Mitigations: The skill uses a list-based argument format for
subprocess.run, which prevents shell injection, and targets a specific well-known utility. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external legal documents (PDFs) and case configuration files (YAML).
- Ingestion points: The
cmd_extractfunction inscripts/case_store.pyscans project directories for PDF files and extracts their text content. Theload_casefunction reads and parsescase.yamlfiles. - Boundary markers: The CLI output and the generated Markdown/HTML views do not utilize explicit security delimiters (e.g., XML-like tags or warning markers) to isolate extracted PDF text from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill script
scripts/case_store.pyhas capabilities to perform atomic file writes to the local file system and execute shell commands viasubprocess. - Sanitization: The extraction logic uses regex patterns to pull specific data points (like case numbers and dates), which reduces the amount of raw untrusted text passed to the agent but does not eliminate the risk of the agent interpreting instructions embedded in the document text.
Audit Metadata