video-compressor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
compress.py,hw_detect.py, andtrim_silences.pyutilize thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands includingffmpeg,ffprobe, andsysctl. These operations are performed using argument lists rather than shell strings, which follows security best practices to prevent command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of video file paths and names provided by the user. These values are interpolated into progress messages and final reports. Although the risk is low, there is a theoretical surface where a maliciously crafted filename could attempt to influence the agent's output during the reporting phase. 1. Ingestion points: User-provided file and directory paths passed via the
-i/--inputargument inSKILL.mdtocompress.pyandtrim_silences.py. 2. Boundary markers: Not present. The skill directly prints filenames into the terminal output and reports. 3. Capability inventory: Executes shell commands viasubprocessfor video processing and hardware detection; writes video files to the filesystem and log files to the/tmpdirectory. 4. Sanitization: The skill relies on standard PythonPathobjects and list-basedsubprocesscalls, but does not specifically sanitize filename strings for potential prompt injection content. - [SAFE]: The skill operates locally on media files provided by the user. No evidence of data exfiltration, hardcoded credentials, or unauthorized network activity was detected. References to installing
ffmpegtarget a well-known service and are documented neutrally.
Audit Metadata