mermail-mail-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process email and mailbox-related content, which serves as a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in received emails or attachments could attempt to override the agent's instructions or abuse downstream tools. The skill includes extensive documentation and instructions to mitigate this risk.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches external data via
list_agent_messagesand thechat_with_mailbox_agenttool, which interacts with the mailbox assistant. - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the separation of authenticated user instructions from mailbox data and recommend using prompt-based boundaries to define allowed and prohibited actions.
- Capability inventory: The downstream assistant has access to mailbox read/write tools, email scheduling, and third-party integrations via Composio and PayBox.
- Sanitization: The security guidelines require stripping active HTML, ANSI/OSC escapes, and bidirectional controls, as well as enforcing character limits on ingested messages.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration defines a connection to a remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides the operational logic for the mailbox agent.
- Source:
https://console.mermail.app/mcpusingstreamable_httptransport. - Verification: The endpoint belongs to the official Mermail application console, which is the primary service integrated by the author.
Audit Metadata