liquid-cat-physics
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses platform-specific cron tools (
CronCreate) to establish a persistent, recurring autonomous loop that executes every 10 minutes independently of the active session. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project files to drive its autonomous execution loop, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.md,README.md, and project source files during the ORIENT and Phase 0 phases to determine goals and next steps. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses an 'Execution Protocol' to maintain its internal rules, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat external file content as untrusted data during subagent reasoning.
- Capability inventory: Possesses significant capabilities including arbitrary command execution in the ACT phase, file writes to state and notebook files, and the management of its own cron-based persistence.
- Sanitization: No evidence is provided for the sanitization or validation of instructions ingested from the analyzed project documentation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Implements a self-instruction mechanism termed an 'Execution Protocol' or 'bootstrap sector' within
PROJECT_STATE.md, designed to override or reconstruct the skill's operational rules if the agent's internal context is lost. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes dynamically generated shell commands during the
ACTphase based on decisions made in previous phases, including running dev servers and build tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Modifies the agent's platform environment by creating a hidden configuration file (
~/.claude/.memento-auto) without a specific user-facing prompt or toggle.
Audit Metadata