liquid-cat-physics

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses platform-specific cron tools (CronCreate) to establish a persistent, recurring autonomous loop that executes every 10 minutes independently of the active session.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project files to drive its autonomous execution loop, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Reads CLAUDE.md, README.md, and project source files during the ORIENT and Phase 0 phases to determine goals and next steps.
  • Boundary markers: While the skill uses an 'Execution Protocol' to maintain its internal rules, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat external file content as untrusted data during subagent reasoning.
  • Capability inventory: Possesses significant capabilities including arbitrary command execution in the ACT phase, file writes to state and notebook files, and the management of its own cron-based persistence.
  • Sanitization: No evidence is provided for the sanitization or validation of instructions ingested from the analyzed project documentation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Implements a self-instruction mechanism termed an 'Execution Protocol' or 'bootstrap sector' within PROJECT_STATE.md, designed to override or reconstruct the skill's operational rules if the agent's internal context is lost.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes dynamically generated shell commands during the ACT phase based on decisions made in previous phases, including running dev servers and build tools.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Modifies the agent's platform environment by creating a hidden configuration file (~/.claude/.memento-auto) without a specific user-facing prompt or toggle.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 08:15 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — liquid-cat-physics