brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture involves reading local project files and intermediate analysis outputs which are then used as context for sub-agents, creating an attack surface where malicious workspace content could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
phases/03a-ui-design-exploration.mdreads project-specific configuration files such aspackage.json,pubspec.yaml, andCargo.toml.phases/04-synthesis.mdreads all role-specific analysis files (analysis*.md) to perform cross-role synthesis. - Boundary markers: The instructions for spawning the
conceptual-planning-agentinphases/03-role-analysis.md,phases/03a-ui-design-exploration.md, andphases/04-synthesis.mdlack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) or instructions for the sub-agents to ignore embedded directives within the interpolated content. - Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use
Skill(*),Agent(...),Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andBash(*). These capabilities allow for substantial filesystem and tool-based operations based on the processed context. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation logic applied to the external content before it is incorporated into the prompt context for sub-agents.
Audit Metadata