team-uidesign
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because user-supplied task descriptions are interpolated directly into worker agent prompts without sanitization or boundary markers.\n
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Worker Spawn Template) androles/coordinator/role.md(Phase 1).\n - Boundary markers: None used to delimit the
<task-description>variable in sub-agent prompts.\n - Capability inventory: The agents have access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andAgent(for further spawning) tools.\n - Sanitization: No input validation or instruction-ignoring guards are present for the requirement field.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The coordinator role includes logic to dynamically generate role specifications (
handleAdaptinmonitor.md) when a capability gap is reported. The skill also depends on the externalui-ux-pro-maxskill for research and design intelligence gathering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes theBashtool for environment discovery (e.g., executingpwdto find the project root) and theAgenttool to orchestrate worker agents. It also utilizes accw clitool for data reading and writing operations.
Audit Metadata