codify-to-knowhow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Direct shell command injection vulnerability in phases/01-load-manifest.md. The variable ${PACKAGE_PATH} is interpolated directly into a Bash block (package_path="${PACKAGE_PATH}") without escaping or sanitization, allowing arbitrary command execution if the path contains shell metacharacters like ; or &.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple command injection vulnerabilities in phases/03-generate-specs.md. Fields extracted from the JSON manifest (such as spec.title, spec.body, spec.keywords, and spec.category) are interpolated into Bash() tool calls for grep and the maestro spec add command. An attacker providing a malicious manifest can escape the quoting to execute arbitrary code (e.g., setting a title to "; touch /tmp/pwned #).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential command injection in phases/04-index-verify.md. The variables ${knowhowPaths} and ${slug} are used in shell loops and grep commands without proper sanitization, which could be exploited if the manifest contains malicious strings.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified. The skill processes external data from knowhow-manifest.json and uses it to drive its execution logic and content generation.
  • Ingestion points: Reads knowhow-manifest.json from the path specified by the user/system in phases/01-load-manifest.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. Data is parsed and used directly.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash, Write, and Edit tools to perform file system operations and execute CLI tools based on the manifest data.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization was found for the data loaded from the manifest before its use in shell commands or file writes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 17, 2026, 12:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codify-to-knowhow