codify-to-knowhow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamicly constructs shell commands using unvalidated input from the knowhow-manifest.json file. In phases/03-generate-specs.md, fields such as spec.title, spec.body, and spec.keywords are interpolated directly into a Bash tool call for the maestro spec add command. A maliciously crafted manifest containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or pipe symbols) could execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data which is subsequently reflected in the agent's workspace and executed commands.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads knowhow-manifest.json in phases/01-load-manifest.md, which is described as being generated by potentially untrusted upstream skills.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the manifest fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash for command execution, and Write/Edit for file system modifications across all phases.
  • Sanitization: The implementation lacks any validation or escaping mechanisms for the manifest's string content before it is interpolated into shell scripts or markdown documentation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 20, 2026, 03:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — codify-to-knowhow