codify-to-knowhow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamicly constructs shell commands using unvalidated input from the
knowhow-manifest.jsonfile. Inphases/03-generate-specs.md, fields such asspec.title,spec.body, andspec.keywordsare interpolated directly into aBashtool call for themaestro spec addcommand. A maliciously crafted manifest containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or pipe symbols) could execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data which is subsequently reflected in the agent's workspace and executed commands.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
knowhow-manifest.jsoninphases/01-load-manifest.md, which is described as being generated by potentially untrusted upstream skills. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the manifest fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashfor command execution, andWrite/Editfor file system modifications across all phases. - Sanitization: The implementation lacks any validation or escaping mechanisms for the manifest's string content before it is interpolated into shell scripts or markdown documentation.
Audit Metadata