skills/catlog22/maestro-flow/learn/Gen Agent Trust Hub

learn

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads arbitrary source code files, wiki entries, git logs, and search results as seen in the follow, investigate, and decompose subcommands (specifically in the A_COLLECT_EVIDENCE and A_BUILD_CONTEXT_WEB actions).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. While the skill defines 'Output boundaries' to restrict where it writes data, it does not utilize delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when reading content from external codebases.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, spawn_agent, and maestro delegate (which initiates a delegated analysis task).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested code content before it is used to generate reports or drive automated investigations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to interact with the maestro CLI and perform recursive searches across the filesystem. This is a functional requirement but constitutes a significant privilege within the execution context.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses configuration and workflow files located in ~/.maestro/workflows/. Access to the user's home directory for configuration is standard for this framework but noteworthy as it spans beyond the local project directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 17, 2026, 12:17 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — learn