learn
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads arbitrary source code files, wiki entries, git logs, and search results as seen in the
follow,investigate, anddecomposesubcommands (specifically in theA_COLLECT_EVIDENCEandA_BUILD_CONTEXT_WEBactions). - Boundary markers: Absent. While the skill defines 'Output boundaries' to restrict where it writes data, it does not utilize delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when reading content from external codebases.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write,spawn_agent, andmaestro delegate(which initiates a delegated analysis task). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested code content before it is used to generate reports or drive automated investigations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to interact with themaestroCLI and perform recursive searches across the filesystem. This is a functional requirement but constitutes a significant privilege within the execution context. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses configuration and workflow files located in
~/.maestro/workflows/. Access to the user's home directory for configuration is standard for this framework but noteworthy as it spans beyond the local project directory.
Audit Metadata