maestro-companion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to interpolate user-provided strings (like task descriptions, intent text, and keywords) directly into shell commands for tools such as
maestro load,maestro search, andmaestro-next. If the input contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to unintended command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it reads and processes companion documents that contain user-supplied notes and insights.
- Ingestion points: Companion documents stored in
.workflow/.scratchpad/are read during theaftermode for review and promotion. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruction-override protections when the agent reads the companion document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write,Edit, andrequest_user_inputcapabilities, and it has the authority to trigger other skills. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation performed on the entries before they are parsed and promoted to other system areas.
Audit Metadata