maestro-companion

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to interpolate user-provided strings (like task descriptions, intent text, and keywords) directly into shell commands for tools such as maestro load, maestro search, and maestro-next. If the input contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to unintended command execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it reads and processes companion documents that contain user-supplied notes and insights.
  • Ingestion points: Companion documents stored in .workflow/.scratchpad/ are read during the after mode for review and promotion.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or instruction-override protections when the agent reads the companion document content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted Bash, Write, Edit, and request_user_input capabilities, and it has the authority to trigger other skills.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation performed on the entries before they are parsed and promoted to other system areas.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 12, 2026, 09:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — maestro-companion