maestro-learn
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The
follow,investigate,decompose, andconsultsubcommands all ingest content from user-specified file paths, wiki entries, and search results using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing the content of read files into the LLM context for analysis (e.g., during the 'forcing questions' phase).
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful capabilities including the
Bashtool for command execution,Writefor file modification, andspawn_agentfor orchestration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the agent's logic. Malicious instructions embedded in analyzed code could potentially influence the agent's actions during the understanding or investigation phases.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is granted access to the
Bashtool. While the instructions specify that file writes should be restricted to the.workflow/directory and source code should remain read-only, the presence of theBashtool allows for arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment. The execution logic uses this for context building and dependency tracing (e.g.,git log), which is consistent with the stated purpose.
Audit Metadata