maestro-next
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by relaying unsanitized user input to subsequent commands.
- Ingestion points: User-provided intent text and flags are ingested from the
$ARGUMENTScontext inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the user-supplied intent string.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use
Bashand can invoke other skills within the agent's execution context. - Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize, escape, or validate the intent string before it is passed as a raw argument to the recommended skill in the
A_INVOKE_SKILLaction. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands to discover its configuration and available modules.
- Evidence: The
A_RESOLVE_COMMAND_PATHaction executesmaestro ralph skills --platform codex --json --quietto dynamically build its routing table from the local environment.
Audit Metadata