maestro-ralph-cli-execute
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executemaestro ralph next --session {session_id}. Thesession_idvariable is extracted directly from the$ARGUMENTSprovided in the delegation prompt. This pattern of shell execution with variable interpolation can be exploited if the underlying CLI does not perform strict validation of the session identifier. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect execution pattern where it accepts a
skill_nameandskill_argsfrom an untrusted external source ($ARGUMENTS) and executes them using theSkill()abstraction. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). - Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable in theS_PARSEstate. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are applied to the arguments before they are passed to the execution action.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, file system operations (Read,Write,Edit,Glob), and the ability to trigger any other skill in the environment via theSkill()function. - Sanitization: There is no validation, filtering, or allow-listing of the
skill_nameagainst a known-safe list before the execution step occurs.
Audit Metadata