maestro-ralph-cli-execute

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute maestro ralph next --session {session_id}. The session_id variable is extracted directly from the $ARGUMENTS provided in the delegation prompt. This pattern of shell execution with variable interpolation can be exploited if the underlying CLI does not perform strict validation of the session identifier.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect execution pattern where it accepts a skill_name and skill_args from an untrusted external source ($ARGUMENTS) and executes them using the Skill() abstraction. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the $ARGUMENTS variable in the S_PARSE state.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are applied to the arguments before they are passed to the execution action.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, file system operations (Read, Write, Edit, Glob), and the ability to trigger any other skill in the environment via the Skill() function.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation, filtering, or allow-listing of the skill_name against a known-safe list before the execution step occurs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 06:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — maestro-ralph-cli-execute