maestro-ralph-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands constructed by interpolating variables that contain data returned from external tool outputs. Evidence: In action
A_MARK_COMPLETE, the skill runsBash("maestro ralph complete ... --summary \"{SUMMARY}\" ..."). Evidence: In actionA_DISPATCH_DELEGATE, it runsmaestro delegate \"{prompt}\" .... Concern: If the interpolated variables (like{SUMMARY}or{prompt}) contain shell metacharacters such as semicolons, backticks, or redirectors, they can escape the command context and execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8). Ingestion points: The skill reads project-specific artifact files like
conclusions.json,review.json, andTASK-*.jsonto build context for the next step (File:SKILL.md, Action:A_LOAD_STEP_CONTEXT). Capability inventory: The orchestrator has access to high-privilege tools includingBash,Write, andEdit. Boundary markers: There is no evidence of using XML delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when wrapping this untrusted external data. Sanitization: The skill lacks logic to escape or validate data before interpolating it into prompts for subsequent tool execution in the loop (Action:A_COMPOSE_DELEGATION_PROMPT).
Audit Metadata