maestro-ralph
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data to guide its decision-making and command generation processes.
- Ingestion points: User-provided intent in
$ARGUMENTS, project-specific state files in.workflow/, and the results of filesystem discovery tools likeGlobandGrep(e.g., inA_DECOMPOSE_TASKS). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate untrusted content from the internal decision logic within the prompt construction steps.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools such as
Bash,Write, andEdit, which are orchestrated based on the processed inputs. - Sanitization: The skill does not specify any validation or sanitization routines for external data before interpolating it into prompts for delegate evaluation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and delegates shell command sequences through a structured lifecycle management system.
- The
A_BUILD_STEPSroutine generates execution chains that are ultimately processed by themaestroCLI and themaestro-ralph-executeskill. - Project-level skill overrides (located in
.codex/skills/) allow the orchestrator to load and execute local configurations, creating a vector for command injection if the project environment contains malicious skill definitions which the orchestrator then triggers.
Audit Metadata