maestro-ralph

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data to guide its decision-making and command generation processes.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided intent in $ARGUMENTS, project-specific state files in .workflow/, and the results of filesystem discovery tools like Glob and Grep (e.g., in A_DECOMPOSE_TASKS).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate untrusted content from the internal decision logic within the prompt construction steps.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools such as Bash, Write, and Edit, which are orchestrated based on the processed inputs.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not specify any validation or sanitization routines for external data before interpolating it into prompts for delegate evaluation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and delegates shell command sequences through a structured lifecycle management system.
  • The A_BUILD_STEPS routine generates execution chains that are ultimately processed by the maestro CLI and the maestro-ralph-execute skill.
  • Project-level skill overrides (located in .codex/skills/) allow the orchestrator to load and execute local configurations, creating a vector for command injection if the project environment contains malicious skill definitions which the orchestrator then triggers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 12, 2026, 09:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — maestro-ralph