manage-drift-realign
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill takes input from
$ARGUMENTSto construct a shell command:maestro timeline --since <resolved_date> --json --output <sessionFolder>/timeline.json. The<resolved_date>is directly derived from the user-provided--sinceflag. If this input is not sanitized by the execution environment, it allows for arbitrary command injection via shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes external, untrusted content from the codebase and
.workflow/documentation. Indeepmode, it uses LLM-based sub-agents to perform semantic analysis on this content, which could be manipulated to return false findings or influence the orchestrator's actions. - Ingestion points: Reads content from
.workflow/specs/*.md,.workflow/codebase/*.md,.workflow/roadmap.md,.workflow/issues/issues.jsonl, and source code files. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when content is passed to scanners.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator can execute
Bashcommands and performWriteandEditoperations on project metadata files and backups. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from the project files before processing.
Audit Metadata