prompt-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to manage local files, including directory creation (
mkdir) and file listing (ls). It also executes local CLI utilities likemaestroand internal scripts located in~/.claude/get-shit-done/bin/to initialize workflows and search for existing prompt patterns. These operations are restricted to the local environment and the vendor's own toolkit. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads configuration files and existing prompt definitions from the project's
.claude/directory and the user's home directory. This information is used to extract patterns and inform the conversion process locally; no external network transfers were identified. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks as it processes untrusted data from existing files on disk. (1) Ingestion points:
.claude/commands/,.claude/agents/, and.claude/skills/(viaSKILL.mdsteps 4a and 5c). (2) Boundary markers: Absent; content from source files is ingested without explicit delimiters instructing the agent to ignore embedded commands. (3) Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write, edit, and execute shell commands. (4) Sanitization: Absent; content is preserved verbatim to ensure zero content loss during conversion. This is evaluated as a low-risk finding because the behavior is intrinsic to the skill's purpose as a developer-controlled formatting tool.
Audit Metadata