scholar-citation-verify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from user-provided .tex and .bib files (as seen in
phases/01-scan-extract.md) to perform verification steps.\n - Ingestion points: Reads citation metadata (titles, authors) from local academic paper files.\n
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or sanitization rules to differentiate between citation metadata and potential malicious instructions embedded in the data fields.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent utilizes
Bash,Write, andWebSearchtools, which represent the capability tier accessible if an injection were successful.\n - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping of the extracted citation strings is performed before they are interpolated into queries or processed by the agent.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs legitimate network operations to well-known academic services to fulfill its primary function of citation verification.\n
- Evidence: Requests are directed to official APIs for CrossRef (api.crossref.org), arXiv (export.arxiv.org), and Semantic Scholar (api.semanticscholar.org), as well as targeted searches on Google Scholar (scholar.google.com), as documented in
phases/02-verify.mdandreferences/api-usage.md. These operations are consistent with the skill's stated purpose and use established technology domains.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes theBashtool to perform file discovery, scanning, and parsing operations as part of its automated workflow.\n - Evidence: The orchestrator in
SKILL.mdand the extraction logic inphases/01-scan-extract.mddescribe using system tools to traverse directories and extract citation keys from paper source files.
Audit Metadata