team-frontend-debug
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill ingests untrusted data from external websites via the Chrome DevTools MCP. Specifically, the
tester,reproducer, andanalyzerroles read DOM snapshots, console messages, and network request details. This untrusted data is then used by theanalyzerto perform root cause analysis and by thefixerto implement code changes. A malicious website could contain specially crafted content designed to influence the agent's logic or trick it into making harmful modifications to the local codebase. - Ingestion points:
mcp__chrome-devtools__take_snapshot,list_console_messages, andlist_network_requeststools used inroles/reproducer/role.mdandroles/tester/role.md. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to distinguish untrusted browser data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Edittool for local file modification and theAgenttool for spawning workers. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of strings retrieved from the browser context is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic Agent Spawning. The
coordinatorrole inSKILL.mduses theAgenttool to spawn background workers using a template. This template dynamically interpolates variables such asskill_root,role_spec, andrequirement. While this is part of the intended multi-agent coordination, spawning agents with dynamically constructed prompts is a high-privilege operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell Command Execution. The
coordinatorrole executesBash({ command: "pwd" })to resolve the absolute path of the project root. While used for legitimate path resolution to ensure worker roles can find their specifications, the use of a shell tool is a notable capability.
Audit Metadata