team-frontend

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the user-provided task description. User input captured from the $ARGUMENTS variable is directly interpolated into the prompts used to spawn worker agents (analyst, architect, developer, and qa) without the use of boundary markers, sanitization, or escaping.
  • Ingestion points: The requirement field in the worker Agent prompt template (found in SKILL.md and roles/coordinator/commands/monitor.md) receives raw user-provided task descriptions.
  • Boundary markers: The skill fails to use delimiters (such as XML tags or unique markers) or "ignore instructions" headers to separate the requirement context from the worker's operational instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The spawned worker agents have access to sensitive capabilities across all scripts, including Bash (command execution), Write/Edit (file system modification), and WebFetch (network operations).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or filtering logic to ensure the user input does not contain instructions that override the worker agent's primary directives.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 06:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team-frontend