team-frontend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the user-provided task description. User input captured from the
$ARGUMENTSvariable is directly interpolated into the prompts used to spawn worker agents (analyst, architect, developer, and qa) without the use of boundary markers, sanitization, or escaping. - Ingestion points: The
requirementfield in the workerAgentprompt template (found inSKILL.mdandroles/coordinator/commands/monitor.md) receives raw user-provided task descriptions. - Boundary markers: The skill fails to use delimiters (such as XML tags or unique markers) or "ignore instructions" headers to separate the requirement context from the worker's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The spawned worker agents have access to sensitive capabilities across all scripts, including
Bash(command execution),Write/Edit(file system modification), andWebFetch(network operations). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or filtering logic to ensure the user input does not contain instructions that override the worker agent's primary directives.
Audit Metadata