team-issue
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands by interpolating data from issue reports, including titles and IDs, which are then executed using the Bash tool. This pattern is prevalent in the exploration and implementation phases.
- Evidence: In
roles/explorer/role.md, the skill builds an exploration prompt template that includes<issue.title>and passes it toBash("maestro delegate ..."). A similar pattern for command routing exists inroles/implementer/role.md. - Evidence: The coordinator in
roles/coordinator/role.mdgenerates session IDs from issue slugs and uses them inBash("mkdir -p ...")calls. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes external issue descriptions and injects them into the prompts of sub-agents and CLI tools without adequate isolation.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via
ccw issue statusinroles/explorer/role.mdandccw issue listinroles/coordinator/role.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the issue text when it is passed to the workers.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities, including arbitrary command execution (
Bash), filesystem modifications (Write,Edit), and the ability to spawn further agents (Agent). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is applied to the issue metadata before it is used to drive the orchestration logic.
Audit Metadata