team-roadmap-dev

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands by interpolating variables containing user-controlled or untrusted data into strings passed to the Bash tool. This pattern is prevalent in the following files:
  • In roles/coordinator/commands/roadmap-discuss.md, the projectGoal variable (directly from user input) is embedded in a maestro delegate command.
  • In roles/planner/role.md, the phaseGoal and contextMd variables are interpolated into maestro delegate commands.
  • In roles/executor/role.md, the description, implementationSteps, and convergenceCriteria variables (parsed from generated JSON files) are interpolated into maestro delegate commands.
  • The presence of shell metacharacters in these variables could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection and data flow attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The initial taskDescription provided by the user and the subsequent projectGoal and phaseGoal derived from it act as untrusted entry points.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic are present to prevent embedded instructions or shell-sensitive characters from altering the intended command execution.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive permissions including Bash (shell access), Write/Edit (file system modification), and Agent (sub-agent spawning), which can be manipulated if an injection is successful.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering before data is used in shell commands or passed between specialized roles.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 06:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team-roadmap-dev