team-roadmap-dev
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands by interpolating variables containing user-controlled or untrusted data into strings passed to the
Bashtool. This pattern is prevalent in the following files: - In
roles/coordinator/commands/roadmap-discuss.md, theprojectGoalvariable (directly from user input) is embedded in amaestro delegatecommand. - In
roles/planner/role.md, thephaseGoalandcontextMdvariables are interpolated intomaestro delegatecommands. - In
roles/executor/role.md, thedescription,implementationSteps, andconvergenceCriteriavariables (parsed from generated JSON files) are interpolated intomaestro delegatecommands. - The presence of shell metacharacters in these variables could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection and data flow attacks.
- Ingestion points: The initial
taskDescriptionprovided by the user and the subsequentprojectGoalandphaseGoalderived from it act as untrusted entry points. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic are present to prevent embedded instructions or shell-sensitive characters from altering the intended command execution.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive permissions including
Bash(shell access),Write/Edit(file system modification), andAgent(sub-agent spawning), which can be manipulated if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering before data is used in shell commands or passed between specialized roles.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata