workflow-skill-designer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because its primary function is to ingest external content (such as existing command files, requirements documents, or user-supplied text) and transform it into executable agent instructions.
  • Ingestion points: phases/01-requirements-analysis.md reads content from user-specified file paths and interactive input.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Write and Edit tools to generate new skills in the .claude/skills/ directory.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes a sanitizePhaseContent function designed to remove command-specific flags and invocation syntax. While it aims for high 'content fidelity' when preserving source prompts, the transformation logic is transparent and scoped to the user's local development environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool for benign administrative tasks related to the file structure of the generated skill package.
  • Evidence: phases/02-orchestrator-design.md uses shell commands to create the necessary directory structure (e.g., mkdir -p "${skillDir}/phases").
  • [SAFE]: No malicious patterns such as credential exfiltration, data exposure, persistence mechanisms, or obfuscation were detected. The skill's operations are consistent with its stated purpose as a meta-development tool for organizing AI agent capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 12:15 PM