cawplan-coding-insights
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources that can contain natural language instructions, potentially influencing agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves raw user prompts and conversation history using commands such as
cawplan session conversation,cawplan session human-inputs, andcawplan session user-human-inputsas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to differentiate between the agent's instructions and the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, allowing it to execute CLI commands and potentially interact with the file system or project metadata. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the fetched conversation text before it is returned to the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses the
Bashtool to executecawplanCLI commands with interpolated parameters. - The workflow involves constructing shell commands using variables for dates, user IDs, and product IDs (e.g.,
cawplan session product-sessions --product-id <pid> --date <date>). While these are functional requirements for a management tool, they represent the primary execution vector for the skill.
Audit Metadata