cawplan-internal-qa-coding-humaninputs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/sync-classify-prompt-from-core-product.mjsusesexecSyncto run shell commands, includinggo runandgitcommands, to update the skill's reference data. This script is intended to be executed in an environment where a specific external repository is present. - Evidence: Use of
execSyncwith thego run ./tools/classify-prompt-export/andgitcommands withinscripts/sync-classify-prompt-from-core-product.mjs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of human-provided text for classification, creating an indirect prompt injection risk.
- Ingestion points: The
content,assistant_message, andprev_messagearguments inSKILL.mdare used to provide the text for analysis. - Boundary markers: The snapshot prompt in
PRODUCTION_CLASSIFY_PROMPT.mduses structured keys (e.g.,content:"...") and explicit instructions to ignore auto-injected ambient blocks. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and contains scripts capable of file system writes and command execution. - Sanitization: The skill's workflow includes steps to normalize whitespace and strip markdown elements like table rules and bold markers from the input before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata